The concept of decadence. – Waste, decay, elimination need not be condemned: they are necessary consequences of life, of the growth of life. The phenomenon of decadence is as necessary as any increase and advance of life: one is in no position to abolish it. Reason demands, on the contrary, that we do justice to it.

It is a disgrace for all socialist systematizers that they suppose there could be circumstances — social combinations — in which vice, disease, prostitution, distress would no longer grow. — But that means condemning life. — A society is not free to remain young. And even at the height of its strength it has to form refuse and waste materials. The more energetically and boldly it advances, the richer it will be in failures and deformities, the closer to decline. — Age is not abolished by means of institutions. Neither is disease. Nor vice.


Toward a critique of the big word . – I am full of suspicion and malice against what they call “ideals”: this is my pessimism, to have recognized how the “higher feelings” are a source of misfortune and man’s loss of value.

One is deceived every time one expects “progress” from an ideal; every time so far the victory of the ideal has meant a retrograde movement.

Christianity, the revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words have value only in a fight, as flags: not as realities but as showy words for something quite different (indeed, opposite!).”


Schopenhauer as throwback (state before the revolution); Pity, sensuality, art, weakness of the will, catholicism of spiritual cravings — that is good eighteenth century au fond.

Schopenhauer’s basic misunderstanding of the will (as if craving, instinct, drive were the essence of will) is typical: lowering the value of the will to the point of making a real mistake. Also hatred against willing; attempt to see something higher, indeed that which is higher and valuable, in willing no more, in “being a subject without aim and purpose” (in the “pure subject free of will”). Great symptom of the exhaustion or the weakness of the will: for the will is precisely that which treats cravings as their master and appoints to them their way and measure.


The Three Centuries

Their different sensibilities are best expressed thus:

Aristocratism: Descartes, rule of reason, testimony of the sovereignty of the will;

Feminism: Rousseau, rule of feeling, testimony of the sovereignty of the senses, mendacious;

Animalism: Schopenhauer, rule of craving, testimony of the sovereignty of animality, more honest but gloomy.

The seventeenth century is aristocratic, imposes order, looks down haughtily upon the animalic, is severe against the heart, not cozy, without sentiment, “un-German,” averse to what is burlesque and what is natural, inclined to generalizations and sovereign confronted with the past — for it believes in itself. Much beast of prey au fond, much ascetic habit to remain master. The century of strong will; also of strong passion.

The eighteenth century is dominated by woman, given to enthusiasm, full of ésprit, shallow, but with a spirit in the service of what is desirable, of the heart, libertine in the enjoyment of what is most spiritual, and undermines all authorities; intoxicated, cheerful, clear, humane, false before itself, much canaille au fond, sociable. —

The nineteenth century is more animalic and subterranean, uglier, more realistic and vulgar, and precisely for that reason “better,” “more honest,” more submissive before every kind of “reality,” truer; but weak in will, but sad and full of dark cravings, but fatalistic. Not full of awe and reverence for either “reason” or “heart”; deeply convinced of the rule of cravings (Schopenhauer spoke of “will”; but nothing is more characteristic of his philosophy than the absence of all genuine willing). Even morality reduced to one instinct (“pity”).

Auguste Comte is a continuation of the eighteenth century (domination of coeur over la tête, sensualism in the theory of knowledge, altruistic enthusiasm).

That science has become sovereign to such a degree proves how the nineteenth century has rid itself of the domination of ideals. A certain frugality of desire makes possible our scientific curiosity and severity — which is our kind of virtue. —

Romanticism is an echo of the eighteenth century; a kind of piled-high desire for its enthusiasm in the grand style (as a matter of fact, a good deal of histrionics and self-deception: one wanted to represent strong natures and grand passions).

The nineteenth century looks instinctively for theories that seem to justify its fatalistic submission to matters of fact. Already Hegel’s success against “sentimentality” and romantic idealism was due to his fatalistic way of thinking, to his faith in the greater reason on the side of the victorious, to his justification of the actual “state” (in place of “mankind,” etc.). —

Schopenhauer: we are something stupid and, at best, even something that cancels itself. Success of determinism, of the genealogical derivation of obligations that had formerly been considered absolute, the doctrine of milieu and adaptation, the reduction of will to reflexes, the denial of the will as an “efficient cause”; finally — a real rechristening: one sees so little will that the word becomes free to designate something else. Further theories: the doctrine of objectivity — “will-less” contemplation — as the only road to truth; also to beauty (– also the faith in the “genius” to justify a right to submission); mechanism, the calculable rigidity of the mechanical process; the alleged “naturalism,” elimination of the choosing, judging, interpreting subject as a principle —

Kant, with his “practical reason” and his moral fanaticism is wholly eighteenth century; still entirely outside the historical movement; without any eye for the actuality of his time, e.g., Revolution; untouched by Greek philosophy; fanciful visionary of the concept of duty; sensualist with the backdrop of the pampering of dogmatism. —

The movement back to Kant in our century is a movement back to the eighteenth century: one wants to regain a right to the old ideals and the old enthusiasm — for that reason an epistemology that “sets boundaries,” which means that it permits one to posit as one may see fit a beyond of reason. —

Hegel’s way of thinking is not far different from Goethe’s: one needs only to listen to Goethe about Spinoza. Will to deify the universe and life in order to find repose and happiness in contemplation and in getting to the bottom of things; Hegel seeks reason everywhere — before reason one may submit and acquiesce. In Goethe a kind of almost joyous and trusting fatalism that does not revolt, that does not flag, that seeks to form a totality out of himself, in the faith that only in the totality everything redeems itself and appears good and justified.


Belief in ourselves is the strongest fetter and the supreme whipping-on — and the strongest wing. Christianity should have made the innocence of man an article of faith — men would have become gods: belief was still possible in those days.


Entry into real life — one rescues one’s personal life from death by living a common life —


Insight: all evaluation is made from a definite perspective: that of the preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a faith, a culture. — Because we forget that valuation is always from a perspective, a single individual contains within him a vast confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives. This is the expression of the diseased condition in man, in contrast to the animals in which all existing instincts answer to quite definite tasks.

This contradictory creature has in his nature, however, a great method of acquiring knowledge: he feels many pros and cons, he raises himself to justice — to comprehension beyond esteeming things good and evil.

The wisest man would be the one richest in contradictions, who has, as it were, antennae for all types of men — as well as his great moments of grand harmony — a rare accident even in us! A sort of planetary motion —


Morality of truthfulness in the herd. “You shall be knowable, express your inner nature by clear and constant signs — otherwise you are dangerous: and if you are evil, your ability to dissimulate is the worst thing for the herd. We despise the secret and unrecognizable. — Consequently you must consider yourself knowable, you may not be concealed from yourself, you may not believe that you change.” Thus: the demand for truthfulness presupposes the knowability and stability of the person. In fact, it is the object of education to create in the herd member a definite faith concerning the nature of man: it first invents this faith and then demands “truthfulness. ”


Toward a critique of the herd virtues. — Inertia operates (1) in trustfulness, since mistrust makes tension, observation, reflection necessary; — (2) in veneration, where the difference in power is great and submission necessary: so as not to fear, an attempt is made to love, esteem, and to interpret the disparity in power as disparity in value: so that the relationship no longer makes one rebellious; — (3) in the sense of truth. What is true? Where an  explanation is given which causes us the minimum of spiritual effort (moreover, lying is very exhausting) — (4) in sympathy. It is a relief to count oneself the same as others, to try to feel as
they do, to adopt a current feeling: it is something passive compared with the activity that maintains and constantly practices the individual’s right to value judgments (the latter allows of no rest); — (5) in impartiality and coolness of judgment: one shuns the exertion of affects and prefers to stay detached, “objective”; (6) in integrity: one would rather obey an existing law than create a law oneself, than command oneself and others: the fear of commanding –: better to submit than to react; — (7) in toleration: the fear of exercising rights, of judging.


I teach: the herd seeks to preserve one type and defends itself on both sides, against those who have degenerated from it (criminals, etc.) and those who tower above it. The tendency of the herd is directed toward standstill and preservation, there is nothing
creative in it.

The pleasant feelings with which the good, benevolent, just man inspires us (in contrast to the tension, fear which the great, new man arouses) are our own feelings of personal security and equality: the herd animal thus glorifies the herd nature and then it feels comfortable. This judgment of comfort masks itself with fair words — thus “morality” arises. — But observe the hatred of the herd for the truthful. —


Let one not be deceived about oneself! If one hears within oneself the moral imperative as it is understood by altruism, one belongs to the herd. If one has the opposite feeling, if one feels one’s danger and abberration lies in disinterested and selfless actions, One does not belong to the herd.


My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic morality.  The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd — but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or the “beasts of prey,” etc.


Morality as an attempt to establish human pride. — The theory of “free will” is antireligious. It seeks to create the right for man to think of himself as cause of his exalted state and actions: it is a form of the growing feeling of pride.

Man feels his power, his “happiness,” as they say: there must be “will” behind this state — otherwise it would not be his. Virtue is the attempt to set the fact of willing and having-willed before every exalted and strong feeling of happiness as a necessary antecedent: — if the will to certain actions is regularly present in the consciousness, a feeling of power may be interpreted as its effect. This is merely a perspective of psychology: always based on the false presupposition that nothing belongs to us that we have not consciously willed. The entire theory of responsibility depends upon the naive psychology that the only cause is will and that one must be aware of having willed in order to believe in oneself as cause.

— Comes the countermovement: that of the moral philosophers, still subject to the same prejudice that one is responsible only for what one has willed. The value of man is posited as a moral value: consequently his morality must be a causa prima; consequently there must be a principle in man, a “free will” as causa prima.- The idea behind it is: if man is not causa prima as will, then he is irresponsible — consequently he has no business before the moral tribunal — virtue and vice would be automatic and mechanical —

In summa: so that man may respect himself he must be capable of doing evil.


Play-acting as a consequence of the morality of “free will.” — It is a step in the development of the feeling of power itself to have caused one’s own exalted states (one’s perfection) — consequently, one immediately concludes, to have willed them —

(Critique: All perfect acts are unconscious and no longer subject to will; consciousness is the expression of an imperfect and often morbid state in a person. Personal perfection as conditioned by will, as consciousness, as reasoning with dialectics, is a caricature, a kind of self-contradiction — A degree of consciousness makes perfection impossible — Form of play-acting.)


The moral hypothesis with the object of justifying God was: evil must be voluntary (merely so that the voluntariness of goodness can be believed in), and on the other hand: the object of evil and suffering is salvation.

The concept “guilt” as not extending back to the ultimate ground of existence, and the concept “punishment” as an educative benefit, consequently as the act of a good God.

Absolute dominion of moral valuation over all others: one did not doubt that God could not be evil and could not do anything harmful, i.e., by “perfection” one meant merely a moral perfection.


How false is the idea that the value of an action must depend upon that which preceded it in consciousness! — And morality has been judged according to this, even criminality —

The value of an action must be judged by its consequences say the Utilitarians –: to judge it by its origins implies an impossibility, namely that of knowing its origins.

But does one know its consequences? For five steps ahead, perhaps. Who can say what an action will stimulate, excite, provoke? As a stimulus? Perhaps as a spark to touch off an explosion? — The Utilitarians are naive — And in any case we must first know what is useful: here too they look only five steps ahead — They have no conception of the grand economy, which cannot do without evil.

One does not know the origin, one does not know the consequences: — does an action then possess any value at all?

The action itself remains: its epiphenomena in consciousness, the Yes and the No that follow its performance: does the value of an action lie in its subjective epiphenomena? ( — that would be like assessing the value of the music according to the pleasure or displeasure it gives us — it gives its composer –). Obviously value feelings accompany it, a feeling of power, compulsion, impotence; e.g., freedom, ease — put in another way: could one reduce the value of an action to physiological values: whether it is the expression of a complete or an inhibited life? — It may be that its biological value is expressed in this —

If therefore an action can be evaluated neither by its origin, nor by its consequences, nor by its epiphenomena, then its value is “x,” unknown —


On the denaturalization of morality. To separate the action from the man; to direct hatred or contempt against the “sin”; to believe there are actions that are good or bad in themselves.

Restoration of “nature”: an action in itself is perfectly devoid of value: it all depends on who performs it. One and the same “crime” can be in one case the greatest privilege, in another a stigma. In fact, it is the selfishness of the judges which interprets an action, or its performer, in relation to its utility or harmfulness to themselves ( — or in relation to its similarity or unlikeness to them).


The concept “reprehensible action” presents us with difficulties. Nothing that happened at all can be reprehensible in itself: for one should not want to eliminate it: for everything is so bound up with everything else, that to want to exclude something means to exclude everything. A reprehensible action means: a reprehended world —

And then further: in a reprehended world reprehending would also be reprehensible — And the consequence of a way of thinking that reprehended everything would be a way of living that affirmed every thing — If becoming is a great ring, then everything is equally valuable, eternal, necessary. — In all correlations of Yes and No, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that is expressed is a perspective, an interest of certain types of life: in itself, everything that is says Yes.


Critique of subjective value feelings. — The conscience. For merely one concluded: the conscience reprehends this action; consequently this action is reprehensible. In fact, the, conscience reprehends an action because it has been reprehended for a long time. It merely repeats: it creates no values. That which in the past decided to reprehend certain actions was not conscience: but the insight into (or the prejudice against) their consequences —

The assent of the conscience, the pleasant feeling of “at peace with oneself,” is of the same order as the pleasure of an artist in his work-it proves nothing at all —

Self-contentment is as little a standard for that to which it relates as its absence is an argument against the value of a thing. We do not know nearly enough to be able to measure the value of our actions: in addition, it is impossible for us to be objective about them: even when we reprehend an action, we are not judges but interested parties —

If noble agitation accompanies an action, this proves nothing about its value: an artist can go through the highest possible pathos of passion and bring forth something wretched. One should say rather that these agitations are a means of seduction: they lure our eyes, our strength away from criticism, from caution, from suspicion, so that we perpetrate a stupidity — they make us stupid —


We are the heirs of the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two millennia: in these we have had longest practice, in these lies our mastery perhaps, certainly our subtlety; we have conjoined the natural inclinations and a bad conscience.

A reverse attempt would be possible: to conjoin the unnatural inclinations, I mean the inclination for the beyond, for things contrary to sense, reason, nature, in short all previous ideals, which were all world-slandering ideals, with a bad conscience.


Man a little, eccentric species of animal, which — fortunately — has its day; all on earth a mere moment, an incident, an exception without consequences, something of no importance to the general character of the earth; the earth itself, like every star, a hiatus between two nothingnesses, an event without plan, reason, will, self-consciousness, the worst kind of necessity, stupid necessity — Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity says to us: “all that must be false, for it arouses indignation — Could all that not be merely appearance? And man, in spite of all, as Kant says-”


One cannot have too much respect for man when one sees how well he understands how to fight his way through, to endure, to turn circumstances to his Own use, to overthrow his adversaries; but when one looks at his desires he appears the absurdest of animals —

It is as if he required a playground of cowardice, laziness, weakness, lusciousness, submissiveness for the recreation of his strong and manly virtues: observe human desiderata, his “ideals.” Desiring man recovers from the eternally valuable in him, from his deeds: he employs nothingness, the absurd, the valueless, the childish for his recovery. The spiritual poverty and lack of inventiveness of this inventive and resourceful animal are terrible. The “ideal” is, as it were, the penalty man pays for the tremendous expenditure he has to meet in all actual and pressing tasks. When reality ceases, dream, weariness, weakness come along: “the ideal” is simply a form of dream, weariness, weakness —

The strongest and the most powerless natures become equal when this condition overtakes them: they deify the cessation of work, of war, of passion, of tension, of oppositions, of “reality” in summa –– the struggle for knowledge, the exertion of knowledge.

“Innocence”: that is their name for the ideal state of stupefaction; “blessedness”: the ideal state of sloth; “love”: the ideal state of the herd animal that no longer wants to have enemies. Therewith one has raised everything that debases and lowers man to an ideal.


The very obscure and arbitrary idea that mankind has a single task to perform, that it is moving as a whole toward some goal, is still very young. Perhaps we shall be rid of it again before it becomes a “fixed idea” —

This mankind is not a whole: it is an inextricable multiplicity of ascending and descending life-processes — it does not have a youth followed by maturity and finally by old age; the strata are twisted and entwined together — and in a few millennia there may still be even younger types of man than we can show today. Decadence, on the other hand, belongs to all epochs of mankind: refuse and decaying matter are found everywhere; it is one of life’s processes to exclude the forms of decline and decay.


When Christian prejudice was a power, this question did not exist: meaning lay in the salvation of the individual soul; whether mankind could endure for a long or a short time did not come into consideration. The best Christians desired that it should end as soon as possible — concerning that which was needful to the individual there was no doubt —

The task of every present individual was the same as for a future individual in any kind of future: value, meaning, domain of values were fixed, unconditional, eternal, one with God — That which deviated from this eternal type was sinful, devilish, condemned —

For each soul, the gravitational center of valuation was placed within itself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the immortal soul! Extremest form of personalization — For every soul there was only one perfecting; only one ideal; only one way to redemption — Extremest form of equality of rights, tied to an optical magnification of one’s own importance to the point of insanity — Nothing but insanely important souls, revolving about themselves with a frightful fear —


No man believes now in this absurd self-inflation: and we have sifted our wisdom through a sieve of contempt. Nevertheless, the optical habit of seeking the value of man in his approach to an ideal man remains undisturbed: fundamentally, one upholds the perspective of personalization as well as equality of rights before the ideal. In summa: one believes one knows what the ultimate desideratum is with regard to the ideal man —

This belief, however, is only the consequence of a dreadful deterioration through the Christian ideal: as one at once discovers with every careful examination of the “ideal type.” One believes one knows, first that an approach to one type is desirable; secondly, that one knows what this type is like; thirdly, that every deviation from this type is a regression, an inhibition, a loss of force and power in man —

To dream of conditions in which this perfect man will be in the vast majority: even our socialists, even the Utilitarians have not gone farther than this. —

In this way a goal seems to have entered the development of mankind: at any rate, the belief in progress towards the ideal is the only form in which a goal in history is thought of today. In summa: one has transferred the arrival of the “kingdom of God” into the future, on earth, in human form — but fundamentally one has held fast to the belief in the old ideal —


The origin of the ideal. Investigation of the soil in which it grows.

a. Proceeding from the “aesthetic” states, in which the world is seen fuller, rounder and more perfect –: the pagan ideal: self affirmation predominates (one bestows –). The highest type: the classical ideal — as the expression of the well-constitutedness of all the chief instincts. Therein the highest style: the grand style. Expression of the “will to power” itself. The instinct that is most feared dares to acknowledge itself.

b. Proceeding from states in which the world is seen emptier, paler, more diluted, in which “spiritualization” and nonsensuality assume the rank of perfection, in which the brutal, the animalic-direct, the proximate are most avoided (– one removes, one chooses-): the “sage,” the “angel,” priestly = virginal = ignorant, physiological characteristics of idealists of this sort –: the anemic ideal. Under certain circumstances it can be the ideal of those who represent the first ideal, the pagan (thus Goethe sees his “saint” in Spinoza).

c. Proceeding from slates in which we find the world more absurd, worse, poorer, more deceptive than we suppose or desire can be consistent with embodying the ideal (– one negates, one destroys –): the projection of the ideal into the antinatural, anti-actual, illogical; the state of him who thus judges (– the “impoverishment” of the world as consequence of suffering: one takes, one no longer gives –): the antinatural ideal.

(The Christian ideal is an intermediate form between the second and third, now with the former, now with the latter predominating.)

The three ideals: a. either a strengthening of life (– pagan) or b. a dilution of life (anemic) or c. a denial of life (– antinatural). The state of “deification” is felt: in the greatest abundance — in the most fastidious selectivity — in contempt for and destruction of life.


Not to know oneself: prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a creature that has good reasons to be in the dark about itself and is prudent enough to be in the dark about these reasons too.


Tendency of moral development. — Everyone desires that no doctrine or valuation of things should come into favor but that through which he himself prospers. The basic tendency of the weak and mediocre of all ages is, consequently, to weaken and pull down the stronger: chief means, the moral judgment. The attitude of the stronger toward the weaker is branded; the higher states of the stronger acquire an evil name.

The struggle of the many against the few, the commonplace against the rare, the weak against the strong — one of the subtlest interruptions of this struggle occurs when the choice, subtle, more fastidious present themselves as the weak and repudiate the coarser means of power —


1. The pretended pure drive after knowledge in all philosophers is dictated by their moral “truths” — is only apparently independent-

2. The “moral truths,” “thus one ought to act,” are merely forms of consciousness of a tired instinct “thus and thus one does act among us.” The “ideal” is supposed to restore and strengthen an instinct; it flatters man to be obedient where he is only an automaton.


Morality as a means of seduction. — “Nature is good, for a wise and good God is its cause. Who, then, is responsible for the ‘corruption of mankind’? Its tyrants and seducers, the ruling orders — they must be destroyed” –: Rousseau‘s logic (compare Pascal‘s logic, which lays the responsibility on original sin).

Compare the related logic of Luther. In both cases a pretext is sought to introduce an insatiable thirst for revenge as a moral-religious duty. Hatred for the ruling order seeks to sanctify itself (the “sinfulness of Israel”: foundation of the power of the priest).

Compare the related logic of Paul. It is always God’s cause in which these reactions come forth, the cause of right, of humanity, etc. In the case of Christ, the rejoicing of the people appears as the cause of his execution; an anti-priestly movement from the first. Even in the case of the anti-Semites it is still the same artifice: to visit condemnatory judgments upon one’s opponent and to reserve to oneself the role of retributive justice.


Course of the struggle: the fighter tries to transform his opponent into his antithesis –– in imagination naturally. He tries to have faith in himself to such a degree that he may have courage for the “good cause” (as if he were the good cause); as if his opponent were attacking reason, taste, virtue —

The belief he needs as the strongest means of defense and attack is a belief in himself, which, however, knows how to misunderstand itself as belief in God: —  never to imagine the advantages and utility of victory, but always victory for the sake of victory, as “the victory of God” –. Every little community (even an individual) that finds itself involved in struggle tries to convince itself: “We have good taste, good judgment, and virtue on our side.” — The struggle compels to such an exaggeration of self-esteem —


The “good man.” Or: the hemiplegia” of virtue. — For every strong and natural species of man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, good nature and anger, affirmative acts and negative acts, belong together. One is good on condition one also knows how to be evil; one is evil because otherwise one would not understand how to be good. Whence, then, comes the sickness and ideological unnaturalness that rejects this doubleness — that teaches that it is a higher thing to be efficient on only one side? Whence comes the hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the good man? —

The demand is that man should castrate himself of those instincts with which he can be an enemy, can cause harm, can be angry, can demand revenge —

This unnaturalness corresponds, then, to that dualistic conception of a merely good and a merely evil creature (God, spirit, man); in the former are summarized all the positive, in the latter all the negative forces, intentions, states. —

Such a manner of valuing believes itself to be “idealistic”; it does not doubt that, in the conception of “the good,” it has posited a supreme desideratum. At its peak, it imagines a state in which all that is evil is annulled and in which only good creatures actually remain. It does not even consider it settled that this antithesis of good and evil is conditional on the existence of both; on the contrary, the latter should vanish and the former remain, the one has a right to exist, the other ought not to be there at all —

What is it really that desires this? —

Much labor has been expended in all ages, and especially in the Christian ages, to reduce mankind to this half-sided efficiency, to the “good”: even today there is no lack of those deformed and weakened by the church for whom this object coincides with “humanization” in general, or with the “will of God,” or with “salvation of the soul.” The essential demand here is that mankind should do nothing evil, that it should under no circumstances do harm or desire to do harm. The way to achieve this is: the castration of all possibility of enmity, the unhinging of all the instincts of ressentiment, “peace of soul” as a chronic disease.

This mode of thought, with which a definite type of man is bred, starts from an absurd presupposition: it takes good and evil for realities that contradict one another (not as complementary value concepts, which would be the truth), it advises taking the side of the good, it desires that the good should renounce and oppose the evil down to its ultimate roots — it therewith actually denies life, which has in all its instincts both Yes and No. Not that it grasps this: it dreams, on the contrary, that it is getting back to wholeness, to unity, to strength of life: it thinks it will be a state of redemption when the inner anarchy, the unrest between those opposing value drives, is at last put an end to. — Perhaps there has never before been a more dangerous ideology, a greater mischief in psychologicis, than this will to good: one has reared the most repellent type, the unfree man, the bigot; one has taught that only as a bigot is one on the right path to godhood, only the bigot’s way is God’s way.

And even here, life is still in the right — life, which does not know how to separate Yes from No — : what good is it to hold with all one’s strength that war is evil, not to do harm, not to desire to negate! one wages war nonetheless! one cannot do otherwise! The good man who has renounced evil, afflicted, as seems to him desirable, with that hemiplegia of virtue, in no way ceases to wage war, have enemies, say No and act No. The Christian, for example, hates “sin”! Precisely because of his faith in a moral antithesis of good and evil the world has become for him overfull of things that must be hated and eternally combated. “The good man” sees himself as if surrounded by evil, and under the continual onslaught of evil his eye grows keener, he discovers evil in all his dreams and desires; and so he ends, quite reasonably, by considering nature evil, mankind corrupt, goodness an act of grace (that is, as impossible for man). In summa: he denies life, he grasps that when good is the supreme value it condemns life —

Therewith he ought to consider his ideology of good and evil as refuted. But one cannot refute an illness. And so he conceives another life! —


Toward a critique of the good man. — Integrity, dignity, sense of duty, justice, humanity, honesty, straightness, good conscience — are certain qualities really affirmed and approved for their own sake with these well-sounding words? or is it a case of qualities and states, in themselves of no particular value, being moved into a certain light in which they acquire value? Does the value of these qualities reside in them or in the use and advantage to which they lead (appear to lead, are expected to lead)?

Naturally, I do not mean by this an antithesis between ego and alter in the judgment: the question is whether these qualities are supposed to have value on account of their consequences, either for the bearer of these qualities or for the environment, for society, for “humanity”: or whether they have value in themselves —

In other words: is it utility that bids one condemn, combat, deny the opposite qualities (– untrustworthiness, falseness, perversity, lack of self-confidence, inhumanity –)? Is the essence of such qualities condemned, or only their consequences? — In other words: would it be desirable that men with these latter qualities should not exist? — In any event, that is what is believed — But here lies the error, the short-sightedness, the narrow-mindedness of nook egoism.
Otherwise expressed: would it be desirable to create conditions in which all the advantage would be with the righteous-so that the opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and slowly die out?

This is at bottom a question of taste and of aesthetics: would it be desirable that the “most respectable,” i.e., most tedious, species of man should survive? the square, the virtuous, the worthies, the good people, the straight, the “oxen”?

If one imagines the tremendous abundance of the “others” gone, then even the righteous no longer has a right to existence: be is no longer necessary — and here one grasps that it is only coarse utility that has brought such an insufferable virtue into honor.

Perhaps desirability lies on precisely the other side: to create conditions in which the “righteous man” is reduced to the modest position of a “useful tool” — as the “ideal herd animal,” at best herdsman: in short, conditions in which he no longer stands among the higher orders which require other qualities.


The actions of a higher man are indescribably complex in their motivation: any such word as “pity” says nothing whatever. The most essential thing is the feeling “Who am I? who is the other in relation to me?” — Value judgments are continually at work.


The “subject” is only a fiction: the ego of which one speaks when one censures egoism does not exist at all.


The “ego” — which is not one with the central government of our nature! — is, indeed, only a conceptual synthesis — thus there are no actions prompted byegoism.”


Origin of moral values. –– Egoism is of as much value as the physiological value of him who possesses it.

Every individual consists of the whole course of evolution (and not, as morality imagines, only of something that begins at birth). If he represents the ascending course of mankind, then his value is in fact extraordinary; and extreme care may be taken over the preservation and promotion of his development. (It is concern for the future promised him that gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism.) If he represents the descending course, decay, chronic sickening, then he has little value: and the first demand of fairness is for him to take as little space, force, and sunshine as possible away from the well-constituted. In this case, it is the task of society to suppress egoism (– which sometimes expresses itself in absurd, morbid and rebellious ways), whether it be a question of individuals or of whole decaying and atrophying classes of people. A doctrine and religion of “love,” of suppression of self-affirmation, of patience, endurance, helpfulness, of cooperation in word and deed, can be of the highest value within such classes, even from the point of view of the rulers: for it suppresses feelings of rivalry, of ressentiment, of envy –the all too natural feelings of the underprivileged — it even deifies a life of slavery, subjection, poverty, sickness, and inferiority for them under the ideal of humility and obedience. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals have at all times upheld the cult of selflessness, the gospel of the lowly, the “God on the cross.”

The preponderance of an altruistic mode of valuation is the consequence of an instinct that one is ill-constituted. The value judgment here is at bottom: “I am not worth much”: a merely physiological value judgment; even more clearly: the feeling of impotence, the absence of the great affirmative feelings of power (in muscles, nerves, ganglia). This value judgment is translated into a moral or a religious judgment, according to the culture of this class (– the predominance of religious and moral judgments is always a sign of a lower culture –): it seeks to establish itself by relating to spheres in which it recognizes the concept “value” in general. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner believes he understands himself is an attempt to justify his lack of power and self-confidence: he would rather consider himself guilty than feel bad for no reason: it is a symptom of decay to require interpretations of this sort at all.

In other cases, the underprivileged man seeks the reason not in his “guilt” (as the Christian does), but in society: the socialist, the anarchist, the nihilist — in as much as they find their existence something of which someone must be guilty, they are still the closest relations of the Christian, who also believes he can better endure his sense of sickness and ill-constitutedness by finding someone whom he can make responsible for it. The instinct of revenge and ressentiment appears here in both cases as a means of enduring, as the instinct of self-preservation: just as is the preference for altruistic theory and practice.

Hatred of egoism, whether it be one’s own (as with Christians) or another’s (as with socialists), is thus revealed as a value judgment under the predominating influence of revenge; on the other hand, as an act of prudence for the self-preservation of the suffering by an enhancement of their feelings of cooperation and solidarity —

Finally, even that release of ressentiment in the judging, rejecting, punishing of egoism (one’s own or another’s) is also, as already indicated, an instinct of self-preservation on the part of the underprivileged. In summa: the cult of altruism is a specific form of egoism that regularly appears under certain physiological conditions.

When the socialist with a line indignation demands “justice,” “right,” “equal rights,” he is merely acting under the impress of his inadequate culture that cannot explain why he is suffering: on the other hand, he enjoys himself; if he felt better he would refrain from crying out: he would then find pleasure in other things. The same applies to the Christian: he condemns, disparages, curses the “world” — himself not excluded. But that is no reason for taking his clamor seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying out, for whom defamation is a relief.


“Thou shalt not lie”: one demands truthfulness. But acknowledgement of the factual (refusal to let oneself be lied to) has been greatest precisely among liars: they have recognized that just this popular “truthfulness” is not a fact. What is said is always too much or too little: the demand that one should denude oneself with every word one says is a piece of naivete.

One says what one thinks, one is “truthful,” only under certain conditions: namely, that one is understood (inter pares) , and understood with good will (once again inter pares). One conceals oneself in presence of the unfamiliar: and he who wants to attain something says what he would like to have thought of him, but not what he thinks. (“The powerful always lie.”)


Schopenhauer interpreted high intellectuality as liberation from the will; he did not want to see the freedom from moral prejudice which is part of the emancipation of the great spirit, the typical immorality of the genius; he artfully posited the only thing he held in honor, the moral value of “depersonalization,” as the condition of spiritual activity, of “objective” viewing. “Truth,” even in art, appears after the withdrawal of the will —

I see a fundamentally different valuation cutting across all the moral idiosyncrasies: I know nothing of such an absurd distinction between “genius” and the moral and immoral world of the will. The moral man is a lower species than the immoral, a weaker species; indeed — he is a type in regard to morality, but not a type in himself; a copy, a good copy at best — the measure of his value lies outside him. I assess a man by the quantum of power and abundance of his will: not by its enfeeblement and extinction; I regard a philosophy which teaches denial of the will as a teaching of defamation and slander- I assess the power of a will by how much resistance, pain, torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage; I do not account the evil and painful character of existence a reproach to it, but hope rather that it will one day be more evil and painful than hitherto

The high point of the spirit imagined by Schopenhauer was to attain to the recognition that there is no meaning in anything, in short, to recognize what the good man already instinctively does –– He denies the possibility of a higher kind of intellect — he took his insight for a non plus ultra. Here spirituality is placed much lower than goodness; its highest value (e.g., as art) would be to urge and prepare moral conversion: absolute domination of moral values. —

Beside Schopenhauer I would characterize Kant: nothing Greek, absolutely antihistorical (his passage on the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (Goethe’s passage on radical evil). Saintliness was in the background in his case, too.

I need a critique of the saint

Hegel’s value. “Passion.” —

Shopkeeper’s philosophy of Mr. Spencer; complete absence of an ideal, except that of the mediocre man. Fundamental instinctive principle of all philosophers and historians and psychologists: everything of value in man, art, history, science, religion, technology must be proved to be of moral value, morally conditioned, in aim, means and outcome. Everything understood in the light of the supreme value: e.g., Rousseau’s question concerning civilization: “Does man become better through it?” — an amusing question, since the reverse is obvious and is precisely that which speaks in favor of civilization.


Overcoming of the affects? — No, if what is implied is their weakening and extirpation. But putting them into service: which may also mean subjecting them to a protracted tyranny (not only as an individual, but as a community, race, etc.). At last they are confidently granted freedom again: they love us as good servants and go Voluntarily wherever our best interests lie.


There are very naive peoples and men who believe that continual fine weather is something desirable: even today they believe, in rebus moralibus, that the “good man,” and nothing but the “good man,” is something desirable — and that the course of human evolution is directed toward the survival of the “good man” only (and that one must bend all one’s efforts in that direction –). This is in the highest degree an uneconomic thought and, as stated, the acme of naivete, nothing but the expression of the pleasing effect produced by the “good man” (–he arouses no fear, he permits one to relax, he gives what one is able to take) .

From a superior viewpoint one desires the contrary: the ever-increasing dominion of evil, the growing emancipation of man from the narrow and fear-ridden bonds of morality, the increase of force, in order to press the mightiest natural powers — the affects — into service.


The whole conception of an order of rank among the passions: as if the right and normal thing were for one to be guided by reason — with the passions as abnormal, dangerous, semi-animal, and, moreover, so far as their aim is concerned, nothing other than desires for pleasure —

Passion is degraded (1) as if it were only in unseemly cases, and not necessarily and always, the motive force; (2) in as much as it has for its object something of no great value, amusement —

The misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various passions and desires; and as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason —


How, under the impress of the ascetic morality of depersonalization, it was precisely the affects of love, goodness, pity, even those of justice, magnanimity, heroism, that were necessarily misunderstood:

It is richness in personality, abundance in oneself, overflowing and bestowing, instinctive good health and affirmation of oneself, that produce great sacrifice and great love: it is strong and godlike selfhood from which these affects grow, just as surely as do the desire to become master, encroachment, the inner certainty of having a right to everything. What according to common ideas are opposite dispositions are rather one disposition; and if one is not firm and brave within oneself, one has nothing to bestow and cannot stretch out one’s hand to protect and support —

How was one able so to transform these instincts that man thought valuable that which was directed against his self? when he sacrificed his self to another self. Oh the psychological wretchedness and mendaciousness that has hitherto laid down the law in the church and in church-infected philosophy!

If man is sinful through and through, then he ought only to hate himself. Fundamentally, he would have to treat his fellow men on the same basis as he treats himself; charity needs to be justified — its .justification lies in the fact that God has commanded it. — It follows from this, that all the natural instincts of man (the instinct of love, etc.) appear to be forbidden in themselves and only after they have been denied are they restored to their rights on the basis of obedience to God — Pascal, the admirable logician of Christianity, went so far! consider his relations to his sister. “Not to make oneself love” seemed Christian to him.


Let us consider the cost of such a moral canon (“an ideal”). (Its enemies are — well? The “egoists.”)

The melancholic astuteness in self-disparagement in Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld) — the inner enfeeblement, discouragement, self-vexation of the non-herd animals —

the perpetual emphasizing of the qualities of mediocrity as the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, the tool-like nature)

the bad conscience associated with all that is self-glorifying and original;

therefore displeasure; therefore the world of the more strongly constituted made gloomy!

herd-consciousness transferred to philosophy and religion; also its timorousness.

Let us leave aside the psychological impossibility of a purely selfless action!


My final proposition is: that the actual man represents a much higher value than the “desirable” man of any ideal hitherto; that all “desiderata” with reference to man have been absurd and dangerous excesses through which a single type of man tried to establish his conditions of preservation and growth as a law for all mankind; that every “desideratum” of this kind ever brought into a position of dominance has reduced the value of man, his strength, his certainty of the future; that the nook-intellectuality and poverty of spirit of man is most apparent, even today, when he desires; that man’s ability to posit values has hitherto been too little developed for him to be just, not merely to the “desirable” values, but to the real values of man; that the ideal has hitherto been the actual force for disparaging the world and man, the poisonous vapor over reality, the great seduction to nothingness



「デカダンス」という概念、―― 堕棄、頽落、廃物は、それ自体では断罪されるべきものではない。それは、生の、生の増大の一つの必然的な帰結なのである。デカダンスの現象は、生のなんらかの上昇や前進と同じく、必然的である。それを除去するということは、意のままにはならないのである。理性は逆に、それにその権利をみとめようとする



















オギュスト・コントは一八世紀の継続である(頭に対する心の支配、認識論における感覚論、利他主義的惑溺)。科学がかくまで主権的となったということは、いかに一九世紀が理想の支配から解放されたかを証明する。願望における或る種の「無欲さ」がはじめて私たちに科学的好奇心や厳正さを可能ならしめる —— これが私たちの種類の徳である・・・













最も賢明な人間とは、いわばあらゆる種類の人間に対する触覚を、しかもときおりその壮大な諧和の大いなる瞬間をもつところの、矛盾に最も富んだ人間であろう——私たちのうちにもある高い偶然! 一種の惑星運動——




畜群の徳の批判によせて。——怠惰のはびこるのは、1)信頼においてである、というのは、不信は、緊張、観察、反省を必要とするから。——2)崇敬においてである、そこでは権力の隔絶が大きく、屈服をよぎなくされる。すなわち、恐怖しないためには、愛したり、高く評価したり、権力の差異を価値の差異と解釈したりする試みがなされ、このためその関係はもはや変革されることがなくなる。——3)真理感覚においてである。真であるのは何か? それは私たちが精神力の緊張を最小限ついやすだけでよい説明があたえられているものである(ところが虚言ははなはだしく緊張せしめる)。——4)同情においてである。たがいに平等視しあい、平等であると感じあおうとこころみ、既存の感情を受けいれるということは、心を軽くしてくれる。これは能動に対する何か受動的なものであるが、能動とは、価値判断の最も固有の権利を守ってたえず活動することである(このような能動は安息をあたえることがない)。——5)判断の非党派性や冷静さにおいてである。欲情の緊張はおそれられ、好んで傍観的な、「客観的」な態度がとられるからである。——6)正直性においてである。ひとは、みずから法則を創造するよりも自己と他者とに命令するよりも、好んで既存の法則に服従するからである。命令することに対する恐怖——、反応するよりも、好んで服従すること、——7)寛容においてである。すなわち、正義や審判を実行することに対する恐怖。





おのれ自身をつかみそこねることなかれ! 心のうちで、利他主義の意味における道徳的命令がささやくのを耳にするなら、そのひとは畜群に属している。これとは逆の感情をもち、おのれの無私無欲の行為のうちに、おのれの危険を、おのれの迷誤を感ずるなら、そのひとは畜群に属してはいない。















行為の価値は、意識のうちでそれに先行するものに依存しているということ——なんとこれは虚偽であることか! ——また、道徳性も、有罪性すらも、これにしたがって測定されてきた・・・


しかし、その結果は知られうるのであろうか? おそらく五歩くらいまでのことであろう。何が或る行為を焚きつけ、燃えたたせ、反撥させるかを、誰が言いうるであろうか? 刺激剤として? おそらくは爆薬に点ぜられる火花として? ・・・功利主義者は幼稚である・・・そして結局私たちはまず知っていなければならなかったのである、何が有用であるのかを。ここでもまた彼らの眼は五歩前方を見うるにすぎない・・・彼らは、禍害なしではすますことのできない大経済について理解してはいないのである。


残っているのは行為そのものである。意識のうちのその随伴現象、行為の遂行にひきつづいておこる肯定と否定、行為の価値はこうした主観的随伴現象のうちにあるのであろうか? (これは、音楽の価値を、それが私たちにひきおこす・・・その作曲家にひきおこす快や不快にしたがって測るというのと同じことである・・・)。行為には、たとえば権力感とか強制感とか無力感とかいう価値感情が、自由とか軽快とかが、明白にともなう、——問い方をかえれば、行為の価値は、はたしてその行為が完全な生の表現であるのか、阻止された生の表現であるのかという生理学的価値に還元されうるのであろうか? ——こうした随伴現象のうちには行為の生物学的価値が表現されているということは、ありうるかもしれない・・・














人間は、卑小な突飛な一動物類にすぎないが、——さいわいにも——いまその時をえている。総じて地上の生は、瞬間であり、偶発時であり、後続のない例外であり、地球の全性格にとってはあくまでささいな或るものである。地球自身が、あらゆる天体と同じく、二つの無の間の一間隙、計画も理性も意志も自覚もない一事変、最悪の必然的なもの、愚昧な必然性にすぎない・・・私たちの心はこうした見方に対して何か反撥をおぼえる。虚栄という蛇が私たちにこう語りかける、「そうしたことはすべて偽であるにちがいない。なぜなら私たちは反撥をおぼえるのだから・・・そうしたことはすべて仮象にすぎないのではなかろうか? だが人間は、カントの言葉をかりれば、それにもかかわらず—— ——」と。








価値の重心はあらゆる魂にとっておのれ自身のうちにあった。すなわち、救済化、あるいは劫罰! 永遠の魂の救い! これは、自我化の極限的形式である・・・あらゆる魂にとって、ただ一つの完全かあるのみ、ただ一つの理想あるのみ、救いへのただ一つの道あるのみ・・・これは、おのれ自身の重要性を不合理なまで光学的に拡大することと結びつけられた権利の平等化の極限的形式である・・・おそろしい不安をいだきながらおのれ自身のまわりを回転しているところの、まったくの無意味に重要な魂・・・






A 世界がより充実し、より円熟し、より完全な姿でみられる「美的」状態から出発すれば——、すなわち、教的理想。そこでは自己肯定が支配的である(ひとは分与する——)。最高の類型は古典的理想であるが、——それはすべての主要本能の出来のよさの表現である。そこにはまた最高の様式が、すなわち偉大な様式がある。「権力への意志」自身の表現。最も怖れられる本能があえておのれを承認している

B 世界がより空虚な、より色あせた、より稀薄な姿でみられ、「精神化」や非官能性が完全なものの位置をしめ、残忍な、動物的なものに直接した、最も身近なものが、もっとも忌避される状態から出発すれば(——ひとは打算しひとは選択する——)、「賢者」、「天使」、僧侶的=処女的=無知が、そうした理想主義者たちの生理学的特性である——、すなわち、貧血した理想。事情によってはそれは、第一の異教的理想を代表するような本性の持ち主の理想ともなりうる(だからゲーテはスピノザのうちにおのれの「聖者」をみとめたのである)。

C 私たちが世界を、そこに理想を推定したり願望したりしえないほど、不条理な、劣悪な、貧弱な、欺瞞的なものと感じとる状態から出発すれば(——ひとは否定しひとは絶滅する——)、すなわち、反自然的なもの、反事実的なもの、反論理的なもののうちへの理想の投影。これが、そのように判断する者の状態であり(——苦悩の結果としての世界の「貧困化」。ひとは奪取し、ひとはもはや与えることはない——)、すなわち、反自然的理想。


以上三つの理想は、A 生の強化(——異教的)であるか、B 生の稀薄化(——貧血的)であるか、C 生の否認(——反自然的)であるかである。「神化」が感ぜられるのは、それぞれ、生の最高の充実において、——生の最もかよわい選択において、——生の軽蔑や破壊においてである。




道徳の発展がたどる傾向。—— 誰でも、おのれ自身がそれで成功するようなもの以外の教えや事物の評価が通用しないことを願望する。したがって、あらゆる時代の弱者や凡庸な者どもの根本傾向はより強い者たちをより弱化せしめること引きずりおろすことであり、その主要手段が道徳的判断である。より強い者のよりより弱い者に対する態度は烙印をおされ、より強い者の高級な状態は悪しざまな別名をつけられる。






誘惑手段としての道徳。——「自然は善である、なぜなら、賢明にして善なる神がその原因であるから。そうだとすれば、<人間の頽廃>の責任は誰がおうべきであろうか? 支配階級という人間の圧制者、誘惑者である、——これこそ絶滅させられなければならない」——。これえがルソーの論理である(原罪へと結論をみちびくパスカルの論理を参照せよ)。






善人」。または徳の半身不随。——あらゆる強いままの自然のままの人間にとっては、愛と憎、感謝と復讐、善意と立腹、肯定と否定とは、たがいに相関的である。ひとが善であるのは、悪でもありうるという代償においてであり、悪であるのは、さもなければ善であることができないからである。ところで、こうした二重性を拒否して、——ただ一面的にのみ有能となることを高級であると教えるあの病癖や不自然な考え方は、どこからでてくるのか? 徳の半身不随、善人の捏造は、どこからでてくるのか? ・・・それがゆえに人間が敵となることができ、害をくわえることができ、憤激することができ、復讐することができるあの本能を、人間が切りすてることが要求されるにいたる・・・ついでこの不自然は、たんに善であるのみのものとたんに悪のみであるもの(神、精神、人間)というあの二元論的な考え方に対応し、前者のうちにはすべての積極的な、後者のうちにはすべての消極的な力や意図や状態が総括される。——かくしてこのような価値評価の仕方が「理想主義的」と信ぜられている。すべての悪は効力を失って、実際には善なるもののみが残存するような状態を考えだす。したがってこうした価値評価の仕方は、善と悪とのあの対立はたがいに制約しあっているということを規程のものとはけっしてみなさない。逆に、悪は消滅すべく、善こそ残存すべきであり、後者は存在する権利をもつが、前者はまったく現存すべきではないのである・・・何が本来ここで願望しているのか?



だが、ここですら生はなお権利を保有している、——肯定を否定から分離することを知らない生は——。全力をつくして戦いを悪とみなすということが、害をくわえ、否定を実行することを欲しないということが、なんの助けになろう! 何といっても戦いはおこなわれている! けっしてそれ以外ではありえないのだ! 悪にあいそをつかし、願いどおりに徳のあの半身不随にとりつかれた善人とて、戦うことを、敵をもつことを、否を言い否をおこなうことを、けっしてやめるのではない。たとえばキリスト教徒は「罪」を憎悪するではないか! ——しかも彼にとってはすべてのものが「罪」であるではないか! まさしくそのように善と悪との道立的対立を信じこむことによって、キリスト教徒にとっては、世界は憎悪にあたいするものや永遠に攻撃されるべきもので満ちあふれてしまったのである。「善人」は、あたかもおのれが悪人でとりかこまれ、不断に悪人の襲撃をうけていると思いこみ、眼を皿のごとくにして、おのれのあらゆる行動のうちから悪をみつけだし、かくしてついには、とうぜんのことながら、自然は悪であり、人間は頽廃しており、幸福は恩寵(言いかえれば、人間には不可能なこと)と解するにいたる。要約すれば、善人は生を否定する、彼はいかにして至上の価値としての全が生を断罪するかをわきまえている・・・これでもって善と悪とについての善人の考え方は論駁されたと言うべきであろう。しかし病気は論駁されるということがない。だから善人はいま一つ別の生を思いつくのである! ・・・


善人の批判によせて。——正直、尊厳、義務感、公正、人間性、信実、率直、やましからざる良心、——これらの耳ざわりのよい言葉でもっていくつかの固有性は、それ自身のために、ほんとうに肯定され是認されているのであろうか? ないしは、ここでは、それ自体では価値に無関係な固有性や状態が、そこで価値をえてくるなんらかの観点のもとに移されているにすぎないのではなかろうか? これらの固有性の価値はそれ自身のうちにあるのであろうか、ないしは、それらから結果する(結果するごとくみえる、結果することの期待されている)有用とか有益とかのうちにあるのであろうか?

私がここで念頭にしているのは、もちろん、判定における自己と他者との対立ではない。問題は、はたしてこれらの固有性がそのために価値をもつと言われるそのものは、これらの固有性の担い手にとってにせよ、環境、社会、「人類」にとってにせよ、それらがおよぼす結果であるのか、ないしは、これらの固有性がそれ自体で価値をもっているのかということである・・・問いかえれば、反対の固有性を断罪し、攻撃し、否定するように命ずるのは(——不信用、虚偽、偏屈、自己不確定性、非人間性——)、有用性ではなかろうか? 断罪されるのは、そうした固有性の本質であるのか、ないしはそうした固有性の帰結にすぎないのか? 問いかえれば、こうした第二の固有性をもつ人間が現存しないということは、願望にあたいすることなのであろうか? ——いずれにしてもこのことが信ぜられている・・・しかしここには、狭隘な利己主義の誤謬が、偏屈が隠されているのである。


これは、根本においては、趣味と美学の問題である。「最も敬すべき」、言いかえれば最も退屈な種類の人間が残存するのは、ねがわしいことであろうか? 方正な者が、有徳な者が、愚直な者が、殊勝な者が、律儀な者が、「有角の牡牛」どもが?




高級な人間の行為はその動機において筆舌につくしがたく多様である。「同情」というような、なんらかのそうした一言でもってしては、まったく何も言われてはいないのである。最も本質的なことは、「私とは何者であるか? 私との関係において他者とは何者であるか?」という感情である。——価値判断がたえず活動している。




「自我」——このものは、私たちの本質の統一的な管理と同一のものではない! ——まことにそれは一つの概念的な綜合にすぎない——それゆえ、「利己主義からの行為など全然ない。


















欲情の超克? ——これが欲情の衰弱や絶滅を意味するというなら、否。そうではなくて奉仕せしめなければならない。そのためには、長いこと、その欲情を圧制する必要があるかもしれない(個々人としてのみではなく、集団、種族などとして)。最後には十分信頼のおける自由がそれにあたえかえされる。すなわちその欲望は、善良な召使いのごとく私たちを愛し、私たちののぞむ最善の方向へとすすんでおもむく。











どうしてこれらの本能が解釈し変えられ、人間がおのれの自己にそむくものを価値あるものとして感取するにいたりえたのか? おのれの自己を他者の自己にゆだねるときに! おお、教会において、教会によって病気をうつされた哲学において、これまで大言壮語されてきた心理学的な惨めさと欺瞞!

人間が徹底的に罪深いものであるなら、おのれを憎悪することができるだけである。根本において人間はおのれの同胞をもおのれ自身にいだくのとは異なった感情でとりあつことはできないであろう。人間愛は弁明を必要とする、——それは、神が人間愛を命令しておいたということのうちにある。——このことから帰結するのは、人間の自然的本能はすべて(たとえば愛の本能その他)それ自体では人間に許されてはいないものと思われ、それを否認したのちに、神への服従にもとづいてはじめて、ふたたび正しいとされるということである・・・キリスト教の驚嘆に値する理論家たるパスカルは、そうした極端に走った! パスカルとその妹との関係を考えてみよ。「おのれを愛されないようにすること」、これが彼にはキリスト教的と思われたのである。


そのような道徳的規律(「或る理想」)がどれほど高価な代価を支払わせるかを考えてみよう。(その敵は——いったい何か? 「利己主義者たち」。)